By Susan Shirk
Susan Shirk has been involved with China research and policy since the early 1970s. She was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs from 1997-2000 and is chair of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego.
苏珊舍克
苏珊舍克自 1970 年代初以来一直参与中国研究和政策。 1997年至2000年，她担任负责东亚事务的副助理国务卿，并担任加州大学圣地亚哥分校21世纪中国中心主席。

President Xi Jinping’s first decade in power has been a study in hubris. He has purged political rivals and adopted heavy-handed policies that have imperiled China’s economy. He laid the groundwork for a crackdown in the Xinjiang region that drove Muslim citizens into thought reform camps and has alarmed and alienated neighbors with an aggressive foreign policy.
习近平主席执政的第一个十年是对狂妄自大的研究。 他清除了政治对手，并采取了危及中国经济的严厉政策。 他为新疆地区的镇压奠定了基础，将穆斯林公民驱入思想改革营，并以咄咄逼人的外交政策震惊和疏远邻国。

And things just might get worse.
事情可能会变得更糟。

The Chinese Communist Party congress, which opens on Sunday, is expected to hand Mr. Xi another five years as general secretary of the party. Rather than a reassuring sign of continuity, his third term as the top leader of China could spell years of uncertainty as problems mount around an unbound leader who has shown little inclination to share decision-making.
周日开幕的中国共产党全国代表大会预计将让习近平再担任五年的中共总书记。 他作为中国最高领导人的第三个任期不是一个令人放心的连续性迹象，而是可能意味着多年的不确定性，因为问题围绕着这位不受约束的领导人，他几乎没有表现出分享决策的意愿。

Mr. Xi fell into the same trap that has ensnared dictators throughout history: He overreached. He has concentrated more power in his hands than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, looming so completely over the country that he’s been called the “chairman of everything.”
习近平落入了历史上曾让独裁者陷入陷阱的同一个陷阱：他越界了。 他把权力集中在自毛泽东以来的任何一位中国领导人手中，如此彻底地笼罩着整个国家，以至于他被称为“万物之主”。

Rivals — real and imagined — have been removed through an extensive anti-corruption campaign. Two more top former officials were jailed last month, accused of financial crimes and disloyalty to Mr. Xi. Mr. Xi has openly accused other politicians of plotting against the party from the outset of his purge ten years ago. He values fealty to himself as more important than competence, and subordinates compete to prove their loyalty by carrying out his policies to the extreme rather than raising harsh truths about negative consequences.
竞争对手——真实的和想象的——已通过广泛的反腐败运动被清除。 上个月又有两名前高级官员被判入狱，被控犯有金融犯罪和对习近平不忠。 习近平从十年前的清洗一开始就公开指责其他政客密谋反党。 他认为对自己的忠诚比能力更重要，下属竞争通过将他的政策执行到极端而不是提出有关负面后果的严酷事实来证明自己的忠诚。

This is precisely the sort of situation that Deng Xiaoping and other former Communist Party leaders had set out to prevent with changes introduced decades ago.
这正是邓小平和其他共产党前领导人在几十年前引入的变革中着手防止的那种情况。

The over-concentration of power in Mao’s hands led to decisions such as his misguided Great Leap Forward, a campaign to greatly increase agrarian and industrial output in the late 1950s that led instead to a devastating famine, and the chaotic political violence of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.
权力在毛泽东手中的过度集中导致了一些决策，例如他被误导的大跃进，在 1950 年代后期大力增加农业和工业产出的运动反而导致了毁灭性的饥荒，以及 1966- 76文化大革命。

After Mao’s death in 1976, Mr. Deng made leadership competition more predictable by introducing term limits and retirement ages for leading posts in the government and military and giving party institutions more authority. A pattern of decade-long reigns set in. But Mr. Deng refused to give China’s legislature and courts authority over the party. Party institutions — their members all appointed by senior leaders — proved to be pushovers for Mr. Xi. No visible resistance was raised when he engineered the abolition of presidential term limits in 2018, which could allow Mr. Xi, who is 69, to stay in power until he dies or is deposed in a power struggle.
1976 年毛泽东逝世后，邓小平通过对政府和军队领导职位实行任期限制和退休年龄，并赋予党的机构更多权力，使领导竞争更加可预测。 一个长达十年的执政模式开始了。但邓小平拒绝赋予中国立法机关和法院对党的权力。 党的机构——它们的成员都由高级领导人任命——被证明是习近平的软肋。 当他在 2018 年策划取消国家主席任期限制时，没有出现明显的阻力，这可能让 69 岁的习近平继续掌权，直到他去世或在权力斗争中被罢免。

The costs of his overreach are piling up.
他的过度扩张的成本正在增加。

Mr. Xi, who favors a state-led, centrally controlled economy, began an abrupt crackdown on major Chinese internet companies last year, part of a plan to redistribute wealth and rein in the private sector. That has been put on the back burner for now, but not before it wiped billions of dollars from the valuations of innovative companies and cast a pall over entrepreneurship, exacerbating an extended Chinese economic slowdown.
支持国家主导、中央控制的经济的习近平去年开始突然打击中国主要的互联网公司，这是重新分配财富和控制私营部门计划的一部分。 目前这已被搁置一旁，但在此之前，它从创新公司的估值中抹去了数十亿美元，给企业家精神蒙上了一层阴影，加剧了中国经济的长期放缓。

And while the rest of the world has learned to live with the pandemic, Mr. Xi has stubbornly refused to loosen his zero-tolerance approach. Officials nationwide are overzealously imposing mass lockdowns and surveillance in a bandwagon dynamic that has echoes of the Great Leap Forward, when officials over-complied with Mao’s damaging directives.
尽管世界其他地区已经学会了与这种流行病共处，但习近平顽固地拒绝放松他的零容忍态度。 当官员过度遵守毛泽东的破坏性指示时，全国各地的官员都过分热心地实施大规模封锁和监视，这与大跃进相呼应。

The Covid policy has angered citizens and saddled local governments with the huge costs of constant testing and quarantining. Private companies stricken by the disruption and regulatory crackdowns are laying off employees, and college graduates are struggling to find jobs. For the first time in years, unemployment has become a serious political risk for the party, and a tanking Chinese real estate market threatens to pull down the entire economy.
武汉肺炎政策激怒了公民，并让地方政府背负着不断测试和隔离的巨额成本。 受到破坏和监管打击的私营公司正在裁员，大学毕业生正在努力寻找工作。 多年来，失业首次成为党的严重政治风险，中国房地产市场的低迷有可能拖累整个经济。

On foreign policy, Mr. Xi abandoned decades of Chinese restraint in favor of a muscular approach designed to restore China’s historical status as a leading power but which is harming its standing in the world.
在外交政策上，习近平放弃了中国几十年来的克制，转而采取强硬的方式，旨在恢复中国作为领先大国的历史地位，但这正在损害其在世界上的地位。

China has militarized disputed islets in the South China Sea, threatened military action against Taiwan, picked a border fight with India and cut off many imports from Australia after that country’s government called for an international investigation into the origins of the pandemic. Mr. Xi destroyed Hong Kong’s autonomy and has deepened China’s isolation from Europe and the United States by aligning with President Vladimir Putin of Russia just before Mr. Putin launched his brutal invasion of Ukraine.
中国已将南海有争议的小岛军事化，威胁要对台湾采取军事行动，挑起与印度的边界斗争，并在该国政府呼吁对大流行的起源进行国际调查后切断从澳大利亚的许多进口。 就在普京开始野蛮入侵乌克兰之前，习近平与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京结盟，破坏了香港的自治权，加深了中国与欧洲和美国的孤立。

Countries that could have been Beijing’s valued partners have joined ranks against China in coalitions like the Quad, which groups together the United States, Japan, Australia and India. The United States and some European countries, whose trade and investment inflows were crucial to China’s re-emergence as an economic power, are now apparently less willing to do business. As Germany’s economy minister, Robert Habeck, said of Chinese protectionism and pressure to ignore its human rights abuses, his country would no longer “allow ourselves to be blackmailed.”
本来可以成为北京重要合作伙伴的国家已经加入了反对中国的行列，如四方联盟，该联盟由美国、日本、澳大利亚和印度组成。 美国和一些欧洲国家的贸易和投资流入对中国重新崛起为经济强国至关重要，但现在显然不太愿意做生意。 正如德国经济部长罗伯特·哈贝克谈到中国的保护主义和无视其侵犯人权行为的压力时所说的那样，德国将不再“允许自己被勒索”。

The greatest risk now facing China and the world is that the consequences of Mr. Xi’s misrule could lead to a point where he feels compelled to provoke a foreign conflict to divert domestic public attention. Mr. Xi’s continued reluctance to share power also could increase the risk of an internecine split in his third term. The level of dissent within the secretive Communist Party is difficult to gauge, but possible signs of frustration have emerged.
中国和世界现在面临的最大风险是，习近平的暴政可能导致他觉得不得不挑起一场外国冲突来转移国内公众的注意力。 习近平继续不愿分享权力也可能增加他在第三个任期内自相残杀的风险。 神秘的共产党内部的异议程度难以衡量，但可能出现的挫败迹象已经出现。

It’s anyone’s guess how much longer Mr. Xi’s rule will last, but there appears no end in sight. The party normally selects a successor five years in advance to groom and introduce him to the Chinese public. But everyone is in the shadow cast by Mr. Xi, who has so far given no hint who his eventual successor might be.
任何人都在猜测习近平的统治会持续多久，但似乎看不到尽头。 该党通常会提前五年选择继任者，为他培养和介绍给中国公众。 但每个人都在习近平的阴影下，到目前为止，他还没有暗示他的最终接班人可能是谁。

Next week’s congress will be closely watched for clues that other leaders might be allowed to take on more power and responsibility. But that seems unlikely. Mr. Xi is almost certain to stay in character, packing the top leadership with his loyalists. And the more concentrated his power, the greater the hazards for China and the world.
下周的国会将密切关注其他领导人可能被允许承担更多权力和责任的线索。 但这似乎不太可能。 习近平几乎肯定会保持原样，将最高领导层与他的忠实拥护者联系在一起。 而他的权力越集中，对中国和世界的危害就越大。

标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。

感谢分享

1024

加速灭亡

清零宗亲自导演1984

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选他上来的老人们肯定后悔了，说明一个志大才疏又心术不正的人都可以把一个党沦为自己统治世界的工具，说明这个本身就又问题，那么多人都不反对？只能说是这个民族该有的劫数

纽约时报的文章不错，就是这个翻译有时候看的云里雾里的，这是网页自动翻译的吧

啥时候是个头

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组织的性质决定了执政的时间，她的到来只不过给了一个加速度罢了！改革才是最好的，也是最终的出路

跟晋凉差不多，
他看到的都是手下人想让他看到的，
营造出一个假象，而他信以为真了。

倒车的速度有点快

感谢分享

感谢分享

感谢分享

y楼主人名不改红字看不习惯了。

1024

贫贱不能移……

中华终于遇到了一个，有蠢又笨又有野心又自以为是盲目自大的千年一帝，万碎万碎万万碎

感谢分享，国贼没错

感谢分享

毒菜者不在乎经济问题，当今世界上几个毒菜政权都是如此（朝鲜、白俄罗斯、俄罗斯、委内瑞拉等）。他们要的是绝对权力下的绝对掌控，这一点三胖无疑是很成功的，但是三胖的成功是建立在家族政权的基础上的。现在的魔幻国经过了三年以防疫为名的极端测试，看如今的P民对高压下的承受力的极限值在哪里，测试无疑是成功的，除了出现个别不和谐的声音外，包括封闭在室内饥饿的极端手段都几乎没有遭到反抗，这给予了极权者极大的信心，而电子码和流调手段以及株连九族更是对个体的控制达到了完美的结果。未来是悲观的。可怜生于斯活于斯的P民啊。

疯狂的时代！

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