The United States does not need to take Xi Jinping’s attempt to project power at face value.
By Michael Schuman
美国不需要把习近平在面子上展示权力的企图当回事。
迈克尔·舒曼

Xi jinping should be enjoying his final days in charge of China. For decades now, the Chinese Communist Party has regularly replaced its senior leadership—a system crucial to the nation’s success—and after 10 years in power, Xi would be due to step aside and allow a new team to guide the country’s future. But when the country’s top cadres meet in Beijing on October 16 for the 20th Party Congress, Xi is widely expected to break precedent and extend his rule for at least another five years.
习近平应该享受他执掌中国的最后几天。 几十年来，中国共产党经常更换其高层领导——这是一个对国家成功至关重要的制度——而在掌权 10 年后，习近平将下台，让一个新的团队来指导国家的未来。 但当中国的高层干部于 10 月 16 日在北京召开党的二十大时，外界普遍预计习将打破先例，将他的统治至少再延长五年。

Although this departure from custom has been mooted for years, the news might send a renewed chill down the spine of some in Washington, D.C. Xi has transformed China from the U.S.’s potential partner to its chief strategic adversary. The Chinese leader appears determined to capitalize on his country’s recently acquired wealth to challenge America’s economic primacy, technological advantage, and military dominance, and even its assumptions about the global order that forms the foundation of American power. Five more years of Xi almost certainly means five more years of superpower competition, even confrontation.
尽管这种背离习惯的做法已经讨论了多年，但这一消息可能会让华盛顿特区的一些人重新感到脊背发凉。习近平已将中国从美国的潜在合作伙伴转变为其主要战略对手。 这位中国领导人似乎决心利用他的国家最近获得的财富来挑战美国的经济优势、技术优势和军事主导地位，甚至对构成美国实力基础的全球秩序的假设。 未来五年习的领导几乎可以肯定意味着超级大国竞争，甚至对抗又多了五年。

That is the conventional wisdom. But maybe Washington should be grateful Xi is sticking around. China’s leader definitely intends to roll back American global influence, but he may not be doing a good job of preparing his own country to attain that goal. The actual results of his policies suggest that he is weakening, not strengthening, China as a competitor to the United States. The longer Xi remains at China’s helm, the less competitive the country may become.
这就是传统的智慧。 但也许华盛顿应该感谢习近平的坚持。 中国领导人肯定打算削弱美国的全球影响力，但他可能没有做好自己的国家准备实现这一目标的工作。 他的政策的实际结果表明，他正在削弱而不是加强中国作为美国的竞争对手。 习近平执掌中国的时间越长，这个国家的竞争力就会越低。

Lost amid the hype about China’s ascent is just how poorly the country has performed under Xi’s stewardship in nearly every aspect of policy. The economy has slowed dramatically. The leadership has given up on meeting its once-sacrosanct growth target. Xi’s aggressive foreign policy has alienated most of the world’s major powers and terrified China’s neighbors in Asia. Many of Xi’s high-profile government initiatives are marred by waste and mismanagement. China’s rise, which Xi has called inevitable, is less, not more, certain because of his rule.
在关于中国崛起的炒作中迷失的是，在习近平的领导下，中国在政策的几乎所有方面都表现得多么糟糕。 经济急剧放缓。 领导层已经放弃了实现其曾经神圣不可侵犯的增长目标。 习近平咄咄逼人的外交政策疏远了世界上大多数大国，并吓坏了中国在亚洲的邻国。 习近平的许多备受瞩目的政府举措都因浪费和管理不善而受到损害。 习近平称之为不可避免的中国崛起，由于他的统治而变得越来越不确定，而不是更多。

That alternative narrative has serious implications for American foreign and domestic policy. In response to Xi’s belligerence, policy makers in Washington feel compelled to contest China on every front: diplomatic, economic, technological, military, and ideological. That was the thinking behind the recently signed CHIPS bill, which is designed to ensure America’s continued mastery of the semiconductor industry against China’s high-tech ambitions. The same strategy guided President Joe Biden’s 2021 Build Back Better World, an infrastructure-building program intended to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and vie for influence in the developing world. These policies were based on the premise that China’s capabilities are keeping pace with Xi’s ambitions. The evidence now suggests that Xi’s aims are outstripping the country’s capacity to sustain them.
这种另类叙述对美国的外交和国内政策具有严重影响。 为回应习近平的好战，华盛顿的决策者感到有必要在各个方面与中国抗衡：外交、经济、技术、军事和意识形态。 这就是最近签署的 CHIPS 法案背后的想法，该法案旨在确保美国继续掌控半导体行业，以对抗中国的高科技野心。 同样的战略指导了乔·拜登总统的 2021 年重建更美好世界，这是一项旨在与中国的“一带一路”倡议竞争并争夺在发展中国家的影响力的基础设施建设计划。 这些政策的前提是中国的能力与习近平的雄心保持同步。 现在的证据表明，习近平的目标正在超出该国维持这些目标的能力。

The timing of Xi’s overreach is fortunate for Washington. Amid the partisan rancor and social disorder that has preoccupied the United States in the past five years, American global power has probably been more vulnerable than at any time since World War II. Xi could have taken advantage of that disarray to expand Chinese influence at America’s expense. Instead, his actions have had the effect not only of keeping the U.S. in the game but also, in certain respects, of enhancing its global standing. The worldwide American network of alliances, which had come under severe strain, is arguably stronger now than it has been in years—in part due to Xi’s policies.
习近平越权的时机对华盛顿来说是幸运的。 在过去 5 年笼罩美国的党派仇恨和社会混乱中，美国的全球力量可能比二战以来的任何时候都更加脆弱。 习近平本可以利用这种混乱来扩大中国的影响力，以牺牲美国为代价。 相反，他的行动不仅起到了让美国参与其中的作用，而且在某些方面也提高了其全球地位。 承受着巨大压力的全球美国联盟网络现在可以说比以往任何时候都更加强大——部分原因是习近平的政策。

Xi’s China remains a threat as the only country with both the intent and the resources to undermine the U.S.-led global order. Yet the failings of Xi’s agenda show that the widely held assumption that China’s rise is as unstoppable as American decline is simplistic. Xi wants to be written into the history books as the man who overturned Pax Americana. Instead, he could end up being the one who preserves it.
作为唯一一个既有意图又有资源破坏美国主导的全球秩序的国家，习近平领导的中国仍然是一个威胁。 然而，习近平议程的失败表明，人们普遍认为中国崛起与美国衰落一样不可阻挡的假设过于简单化。 习近平希望以推翻美国和平的人的身份载入史册。 相反，他最终可能会成为保存它的人。

When xi jinping claimed power in 2012, most China experts anticipated that he would follow the immensely successful path laid by the “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s—based on liberalizing economic reforms, integration with the global economy, and a partnership with the United States. Xi had previously served as an official in some of China’s most economically vibrant regions, so he had long experience with Deng’s central principle of “reform and opening up.” Shortly before Xi became the country’s new leader, he had had extensive interactions with then Vice President Joe Biden, which left the impression that Xi valued China’s fruitful relationship with Washington.
当习近平在 2012 年上台时，大多数中国专家预计他将走上 1980 年代“最高领导人”邓小平铺就的极其成功的道路——基于自由化经济改革、融入全球经济以及与中国建立伙伴关系。 美国。 习近平此前曾在中国一些经济最活跃的地区担任官员，因此他对邓小平“改革开放”的核心原则有着长期的经验。 在习成为该国新领导人前不久，他与当时的副总统乔·拜登进行了广泛的互动，这给人的印象是习重视中国与华盛顿的富有成果的关系。

As his rule has unfolded, however, those early assumptions have proved to be wrong. Highly ideological, fiercely nationalist, and obsessed with political control, Xi has deviated sharply from his predecessors’ policies. In so doing, he has altered China’s course in profound and unpredictable ways.
然而，随着他的统治展开，那些早期的假设被证明是错误的。 高度意识形态、强烈的民族主义和痴迷于政治控制的习大幅度偏离了前任的政策。 通过这样做，他以深刻而难以预测的方式改变了中国的进程。

Most dramatically of all, Xi has entirely revised China’s foreign policy. He apparently believes that China’s moment to assume the status of the world’s most powerful country has arrived. Rather than treating Washington as a partner, Xi considers the U.S. to be China’s most dangerous adversary. Instead of immersing China in the American-led global order, Xi is promoting his own vision of a Sinocentric alternative, one that is friendlier to authoritarian regimes. Notably, the Chinese leader has forged a new friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who Xi seems to believe can be an ally in his quest to roll back American power.
最引人注目的是，习近平彻底修改了中国的外交政策。 他显然认为，中国成为世界第一强国的时刻已经到来。 习近平没有将华盛顿视为合作伙伴，而是认为美国是中国最危险的对手。 习近平没有让中国沉浸在美国主导的全球秩序中，而是在宣传他自己的以中国为中心的替代方案，一种对威权政权更友好的替代方案。 值得注意的是，这位中国领导人与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京建立了新的友谊，习近平似乎相信普京可以成为他寻求削弱美国力量的盟友。

Yet the more openly hostile China has become to the current international system, the stronger U.S. alliances have grown. Xi’s agenda has persuaded the world’s democracies to tighten their ties to the United States and to one another in order to counter the threat he presents.
然而，中国对当前国际体系越公开敌视，美国的联盟就越强大。 习近平的议程已说服世界民主国家加强与美国和彼此之间的联系，以应对他提出的威胁。

Initially, European leaders were uncomfortable with Washington’s tougher line on China, insisting on their “strategic autonomy.” This divergence sowed some dissension within the Atlantic alliance. However, Xi’s support for Putin amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has gone a long way toward healing that rift. At a virtual summit in April, ostensibly meant to bolster cooperation between China and Europe, the leaders of the European Union criticized Xi’s pro-Russia stance, warning him against aiding Putin’s war effort.
最初，欧洲领导人对华盛顿对中国的强硬路线感到不安，坚持他们的“战略自主权”。 这种分歧在大西洋联盟内部引发了一些分歧。 然而，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰期间，习近平对普京的支持对弥合这一裂痕大有帮助。 在 4 月的虚拟峰会上，欧盟领导人在表面上是为了加强中欧合作，批评了习近平的亲俄立场，警告他不要帮助普京的战争努力。

Then, in June, the leaders of Washington’s four main partners in the Pacific—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—participated in a NATO summit for the first time to discuss the Chinese threat. This was a sign that a more coordinated or fully united alliance that brought together the democratic powers in Europe and Asia might be possible. In addition, India—usually wary of entangling itself in superpower competition—has become more active in the Quad (a security partnership that also includes Australia, Japan, and the U.S.). This suggests that India sees the group as a potential bulwark against Beijing, which has alarmed Indian leaders by pressing territorial claims along the two countries’ disputed border.
然后，6 月，华盛顿在太平洋的四个主要伙伴——日本、韩国、澳大利亚和新西兰——的领导人首次参加了北约峰会，讨论了中国的威胁。 这表明一个将欧洲和亚洲的民主力量聚集在一起的更加协调或完全统一的联盟可能是可能的。 此外，印度——通常对卷入超级大国竞争持谨慎态度——在四方（也包括澳大利亚、日本和美国的安全伙伴关系）中变得更加活跃。 这表明印度将该组织视为对抗北京的潜在堡垒，北京通过在两国有争议的边界沿线提出领土主张，令印度领导人感到震惊。

Xi seems not to care about these effects of his actions. In mid-September, on his first international diplomatic trip since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi chose to meet Putin, thumbing his nose at the United States and its European allies. He has also pressed ahead with his undiplomatic diplomacy, which has at times descended into threats and demands delivered by his appointees. In a July meeting with his Australian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi blamed the two countries’ strained relations on Canberra’s “irresponsible words and deeds.” He went on to say that they could be improved—if Australia avoided “being controlled by any third party”—that is, the U.S.—according to an official Chinese summary of the conversation.
习似乎并不关心他的行为的这些影响。 9 月中旬，在他自武汉肺炎开始以来的首次国际外交访问中，习近平选择会见普京，对美国及其欧洲盟友嗤之以鼻。 他还推进了他的非外交外交，这有时会演变成他任命的人提出的威胁和要求。 在 7 月与澳大利亚外长的会晤中，中国外交部长王毅将两国关系紧张归咎于堪培拉“不负责任的言行”。 他接着说，根据中国官方对谈话的总结，如果澳大利亚避免“被任何第三方控制”，即美国，他们可以得到改善。

Shortly after that, China’s foreign ministry directly threatened the U.S. that it would “pay the price” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which Beijing perceived as a violation of its sovereignty. (The government in Beijing considers Taiwan part of China.) A few days later, a senior Chinese official warned the Israeli ambassador to Beijing not to allow the U.S. to influence Israel’s approach to China, with a tactless claim that the Jews and the Chinese share a common grievance as victims of the West.
此后不久，中国外交部直接威胁美国，要为众议院议长南希佩洛西访问台湾“付出代价”，北京认为这是对中国主权的侵犯。 （北京政府认为台湾是中国的一部分。）几天后，一名中国高级官员警告以色列驻北京大使不要让美国影响以色列对中国的态度，并轻描淡写地声称犹太人和中国人有共同点——同为西方受害者。

As a consequence of all this, China’s image has deteriorated sharply around the world, according to a recent survey of 19 countries, mostly major democracies, by the Pew Research Center. Xi himself fares poorly, too, with respondents in many countries expressing little or no confidence that the Chinese leader will “do the right thing” in international affairs.
皮尤研究中心最近对 19 个国家（主要是主要民主国家）进行的一项调查显示，由于这一切，中国在全球的形象急剧恶化。 习近平本人也表现不佳，许多国家的受访者对中国领导人在国际事务中“做正确的事”表示很少或没有信心。

China is perceived somewhat more favorably in parts of the developing world, and Beijing’s foreign policy has become increasingly focused on winning support in what’s called the “Global South.” But even there, Xi blunders. China, for instance, failed to corral the small nations of the South Pacific into a security and economic pact, in part because of Beijing’s arrogance. Henry Puna, the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, a regional policy organization, said in a July briefing that local leaders had rejected the initiative because Chinese officials had presented them with fully drafted documents for the pact without consultation. “If anybody knows what we want and what we need and what our priorities are, it’s not other people—it’s us,” he said.
中国在发展中世界的部分地区被认为更为有利，北京的外交政策越来越注重在所谓的“全球南方”中赢得支持。 但即便如此，习近平也犯了错误。 例如，中国未能将南太平洋的小国纳入安全和经济协定，部分原因是北京的傲慢。 区域政策组织太平洋岛屿论坛秘书长亨利普纳在 7 月的一次简报中表示，地方领导人拒绝了该倡议，因为中国官员未经协商就向他们提交了该协议的完整起草文件。 “如果有人知道我们想要什么，我们需要什么以及我们的优先事项是什么，那不是其他人——而是我们，”他说。

Xi isn’t doing much better at home, particularly with China’s economy. Growth has slowed significantly on his watch. In 2012, at the start of his tenure, the economy grew 7.8 percent, but this year the International Monetary Fund forecasts a meager 3.3 percent expansion. A reduction in the rate of growth was probably inevitable as the economy developed, but Xi’s policies have likely made matters worse.
习近平在国内的表现也好不到哪里去，尤其是在中国经济方面。 在他的领导下，增长明显放缓。 2012 年，在他上任之初，经济增长了 7.8%，但今年国际货币基金组织预测仅增长 3.3%。 随着经济的发展，增长率下降可能是不可避免的，但习近平的政策可能使情况变得更糟。

The key to China’s decades-long economic boom was the withdrawal of state intervention in the economy and its opening to overseas trade and investment, which allowed private enterprise to thrive. To some extent, Xi has reversed that—enough to undercut some of the most vibrant sectors of the economy and divert capital and talent into wasteful endeavors, such as a slate of state-led industrial programs.
中国长达数十年的经济繁荣的关键是国家对经济的干预的退出以及对海外贸易和投资的开放，这使得私营企业得以蓬勃发展。 在某种程度上，习近平已经扭转了这一局面——足以削弱一些最具活力的经济部门，并将资本和人才转移到浪费性的努力中，例如一系列国家主导的工业项目。

The most obvious sign of that shift is the extensive new regulatory burden imposed on private companies. Some of it is well intentioned—ensuring that food-delivery workers get better treatment, for instance—but all of it has been introduced haphazardly and has curtailed the expansion of some of the country’s most important companies. The once-flourishing private-education industry, which offered after-school classes for college-hungry kids, has suffered layoffs and heavy financial losses after an edict forbidding these businesses from making money out of teaching core-curriculum subjects to most students. One prominent technology firm, the ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing, has suffered so much harassment from a cybersecurity investigation and restrictions on its operations that its share price has plunged by more than 80 percent since its initial public offering a year ago.
这种转变最明显的迹象是对私营公司施加的广泛的新监管负担。 其中一些是出于好意——例如，确保送餐工人得到更好的待遇——但所有这些都是随意引入的，并限制了该国一些最重要公司的扩张。 曾经蓬勃发展的私立教育行业曾为渴望上大学的孩子提供课后课程，但在一项法令禁止这些企业从向大多数学生教授核心课程科目中赚钱后，该行业遭受了裁员和严重的经济损失。 一家著名的科技公司，叫车应用滴滴出行，在网络安全调查和运营限制方面遭受了如此多的骚扰，以至于其股价自一年前首次公开募股以来暴跌了 80% 以上。

Instead of propelling fresh economic growth, the tech sector as a whole has been downsizing and laying off employees. That has made jobs harder to find for recent college graduates: In July, youth unemployment reached an all-time high of nearly 20 percent (though it improved slightly in August).
整个科技行业并没有推动新的经济增长，而是一直在裁员和裁员。 这使得应届大学毕业生更难找到工作：7 月份，青年失业率达到了近 20% 的历史新高（尽管 8 月份略有改善）。

Xi’s motivations appear part ideological, part purely political. He seems to fear that Big Business, and especially the tech sector, could amass sufficient influence and wealth to pose a challenge to Communist rule. Party officials have said plainly that they want greater control over the management of private enterprises, and Xi himself has spoken of the “need to prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital.” Xi prefers instead state-led endeavors that he can more easily superintend. The government has provided lavish investments, subsidies, and tax breaks to support industries that Xi’s bureaucrats favor in sectors they want China to dominate, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence.
习近平的动机似乎部分是意识形态的，部分是纯政治的。 他似乎担心大企业，尤其是科技行业，可能会积累足够的影响力和财富来对共产党的统治构成挑战。 党的官员明确表示，他们希望加强对民营企业管理的控制，而习近平本人也曾谈到“要防止资本无序扩张和无节制增长”。 相反，习近平更喜欢他更容易监督的国家主导的努力。 政府提供了大量投资、补贴和税收减免，以支持习近平的官僚在他们希望中国主导的行业中青睐的行业，包括电动汽车、半导体和人工智能。

Although these industrial programs are in too early a phase to pass final judgment on, and there are a few signs of progress, the results so far are generally not encouraging. One observer, Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted in a recent essay that in spite of huge government support, “there is almost no sector where China is the dominant technology leader.”
尽管这些工业计划还处于最后判断的早期阶段，并且有一些进展迹象，但迄今为止的结果普遍并不令人鼓舞。 一位观察家、战略与国际研究中心的高级顾问斯科特·肯尼迪在最近的一篇文章中指出，尽管得到了政府的大力支持，但“几乎没有哪个行业是中国在技术领域占据主导地位的”。

One of the most high profile of these state-driven missions—to develop a semiconductor industry advanced enough to make the country self-reliant—has been plagued by corruption. To date, it has made only glacial progress in catching up to industry leaders in the U.S., and has not come close to reducing the Chinese economy’s dependence on foreign-made chips.
这些国家驱动的任务中最引人注目的任务之一——发展一个足够先进的半导体产业，使国家能够自力更生——一直受到腐败的困扰。 迄今为止，它在追赶美国的行业领导者方面只取得了缓慢的进展，而且还没有接近减少中国经济对外国制造芯片的依赖。

Xi’s apparent distrust of free-market reforms has also exacerbated the economy’s most dangerous weakness: its broken growth model. Chinese policy makers and economists worldwide have long warned that China’s growth is too dependent on investment, which is often debt driven and excessive—squandering resources on unnecessary apartments, factories, and infrastructure. Xi continued the practice of pumping credit into the economy whenever it slowed below the party’s preferred target, and he’s suffering for it today. Debt has risen steeply during Xi’s tenure, from less than double national output in 2012 to almost triple today.
习近平对自由市场改革的明显不信任也加剧了经济最危险的弱点：破碎的增长模式。 中国的政策制定者和世界各地的经济学家早就警告说，中国的增长过于依赖投资，而投资往往是债务驱动的过度投资——将资源浪费在不必要的公寓、工厂和基础设施上。 习近平继续在经济放缓至低于党的首选目标时向经济注入信贷的做法，他今天为此受苦。 在习近平任职期间，债务急剧上升，从 2012 年全国产出的不到两倍增长到今天的近三倍。

The consequences are emerging in the bloated but vital property sector. A government attempt to rein in highly indebted developers led to a crisis last year at one of the industry’s giants, Evergrande, and the sector’s troubles have deepened. With developers defaulting, property sales falling, real-estate prices sinking, and new construction slumping, the instability of the sector represents a risk to the nation’s banks, which are deep in property-related lending, as well as to the wealth of the country’s middle class. In a remarkable indication of diminished public confidence, families across the country recently engaged in a “mortgage strike”—suspending payments on unfinished apartments out of concern that cash-strapped builders will never complete them.
臃肿但至关重要的房地产行业正在出现后果。 去年，政府试图控制负债累累的开发商导致该行业巨头之一恒大陷入危机，该行业的麻烦已经加深。 随着开发商违约、房地产销售下降、房地产价格下跌和新建筑下滑，该行业的不稳定性对深陷房地产相关贷款的国家银行以及该国的财富构成了风险。 中产阶级。 公众信心下降的一个显着迹象是，全国各地的家庭最近进行了“抵押罢工”——由于担心资金短缺的建筑商永远无法完成未完工的公寓，暂停付款。

Xi is adding to these woes with his strict pandemic controls. Undoubtedly, the biggest achievement of Xi’s tenure was limiting COVID-19’s hold in China and averting the scale of public-health crisis that so many other countries have suffered. But Xi’s mandate that COVID cases must be kept at or near zero has become an intolerable burden on the nation. Recurring closures of major cities and industrial zones have stifled travel, output, and commerce. Hardest hit have been the smallest businesses, those neighborhood restaurants, salons, and corner shops that provide crucial urban employment.
习近平通过严格的疫情控制加剧了这些困境。 毫无疑问，习近平任期内的最大成就是限制了武汉肺炎在中国的控制，并避免了许多其他国家遭受的公共卫生危机的规模。 但习近平要求将武汉肺炎病例保持在或接近于零的要求已成为国家难以承受的负担。 主要城市和工业区的反复关闭扼杀了旅行、产出和商业。 受灾最严重的是那些提供关键城市就业机会的社区餐馆、沙龙和街角商店。

Amid the strain of quarantines and joblessness, domestic discontent has reached an unusually high level. The government faced widespread resistance in imposing its two-month COVID shutdown of Shanghai earlier this year. Residents confined to their homes banged pots and pans and screamed out of their windows to protest the harsh restrictions. In Beijing, where residents must still present a recent negative COVID test in order to ride the subway or eat in a restaurant, testing stations have become targets for vandalism, in some cases defaced with graffiti reading “Give me liberty or give me death.”
在隔离和失业的压力下，国内的不满情绪达到了异常高的水平。 政府在今年早些时候对上海实施为期两个月的武汉肺炎关闭时面临广泛的阻力。 被限制在家中的居民敲打锅碗瓢盆，从窗外尖叫，抗议严厉的限制措施。 在北京，居民仍然必须出示最近的武汉肺炎检测阴性才能乘坐地铁或在餐厅吃饭，检测站已成为破坏行为的目标，在某些情况下，上面写着“给我自由或给我死亡”的涂鸦。

The sources of public dissatisfaction are not limited to the lockdowns. In July, hundreds of protesters from all over the country massed in the central city of Zhengzhou after their bank deposits were frozen thanks to a local financial scandal.
公众不满的来源不仅限于封锁。 7 月，由于当地的金融丑闻，银行存款被冻结后，来自全国各地的数百名抗议者聚集在郑州。

The angry mood seems to have overwhelmed efforts to censor criticism on Chinese social media. “People are not happy!” proclaimed one recent post on Weibo, China’s version of Twitter. “Your government positions are secure but people at the bottom are having a hard time surviving.”
愤怒的情绪似乎压倒了审查中国社交媒体批评的努力。 “人家不高兴！” 在中国版的 Twitter 微博上宣布了最近的一篇帖子。 “你的政府职位是安全的，但处于底层的人很难生存。”

The evidence of rising discontent with Xi’s government is anecdotal, of course. In an environment without free speech and a free press, what the Chinese public really thinks about Xi Jinping is impossible to gauge. But the willingness of ordinary citizens to risk reprisals for their displays of defiance—in Zhengzhou unidentified thugs assaulted protesters with the apparent complicity of local authorities—is a measure of how frustrated people are with the current state of China.
当然，对习近平政府日益不满的证据是轶事。 在没有言论自由和新闻自由的环境中，中国公众对习近平的真实看法是无法估量的。 但是，普通公民愿意冒着报复的风险——在郑州，身份不明的暴徒袭击了抗议者，显然是地方当局的同谋——衡量了人们对中国当前状况的失望程度。

None of these diplomatic, economic, or social problems appear likely to derail Xi’s quest for a third term. They may, however, make his rule unpredictable. The more China’s fortunes fade, the more of a threat Xi may become—not unlike his friend Putin. Xi has shifted toward nationalism to legitimize his hold on power. Hence Beijing’s heightened rhetoric on issues such as Taiwan, and the relentless anti-American propaganda from its foreign ministry and state media. Xi needs enemies abroad to deflect public disaffection with his failures at home.
这些外交、经济或社会问题似乎都不会破坏习近平对第三个任期的追求。 然而，它们可能会使他的规则变得不可预测。 中国的命运越是衰落，习近平就可能成为更大的威胁——这与他的朋友普京不同。 习近平已经转向民族主义，以使他对权力的掌控合法化。 因此，北京在台湾等问题上的言辞更加激烈，其外交部和官方媒体也进行了无情的反美宣传。 习近平需要国外的敌人来转移公众对他在国内的失败的不满。

For Washington, Xi’s continued rule presents both dangers and opportunities. The correct strategy will be to ensure that tensions do not escalate into conflict, while capitalizing on Xi’s missteps to bolster American power. This approach involves a delicate balance, one fraught with the possibility of war. But if Washington manages the situation well, the U.S. could reap the benefits of Xi’s rule and make China bear the costs.
对华盛顿来说，习近平的持续统治既带来了危险，也带来了机遇。 正确的策略是确保紧张局势不会升级为冲突，同时利用习近平的失误来增强美国的实力。 这种方法涉及一种微妙的平衡，一种充满战争的可能性。 但如果华盛顿处理得好，美国可以从习近平的统治中获益，让中国承担成本。

Michael Schuman is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, and the author of Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World and The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth.
迈克尔·舒曼是《大西洋月刊》的特约撰稿人，着有《被打断的超级大国：世界中国史》和《奇迹：亚洲追求财富的史诗故事》。

标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。

皮尤研究中心报告截图 (长文，懒得弄)

 

 

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连任不用怀疑了

包子赢麻了  连任到死

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一个靠抄作业抄到老二的，总想着把学霸干掉

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窝里横，一头猪

老调长谈，我大清朝的一尊—清零帝就喜欢美帝看不惯，还干不掉的烦恼。再说，美帝不要臭美，什么跟你们竞争世界强国地位，我大清零帝是关门尿尿—自己玩

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拭目以待，首个与化断交的国家。

我就看看

总加速师加油倒车吧

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加速吧

小人炸富，张扬跋扈，自乱阵脚，自取灭亡。

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连任是他的渴望，但是现实还是好好享受最后几天，国内政治风向，各大门户网站风向已经变了。