[2022-11-18] 华盛顿邮报 - 社论：中国防疫世界最佳！
![]() Wuhan’s early covid cases are a mystery. What is China hiding?
By the Editorial Board
武汉早期的武汉肺炎病例是个谜。 中国在隐瞒什么？
编辑委员会
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The story of how the pandemic got started — and turned into a global catastrophe — remains a black box. It should not be.
疫情如何开始并演变成全球灾难的故事仍然是一个黑匣子。 这并不应该。
The first cases could provide the most important clues about the origins of the virus, yet we know the least about them. They could show whether the outbreak began by a zoonotic spillover, perhaps from animals sold at the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, China, or was an inadvertent research-related accident, such as a leak from a research facility in Wuhan. The early cases could illuminate missteps in public health that allowed the virus to spread. They could point to failures in the early warning and surveillance systems, offering important lessons for the future. And knowing more about the early cases could reveal the extent to which China concealed vital information from the public when the outbreak might still have been brought under control.
第一批病例是可以提供有关病毒起源的最重要线索，但我们对它们知之甚少。 他们可以显示疫情是由人畜共患外溢开始的，可能来自中国武汉华南海鲜市场出售的动物，还是与研究相关的意外事故，例如武汉一家研究机构的泄漏。 早期的病例可能会说明导致病毒传播的是公共卫生失误。 他们可以指出早期预警和监视系统的故障，为未来提供重要的经验教训。 了解更多有关早期病例的信息可能会揭示中国在疫情可能仍能得到控制的时候向公众隐瞒重要信息的程度。
The Beijing government has insisted the virus came from somewhere abroad, perhaps imported on frozen food. But the key to unlocking the origins lies within China. It is particularly important to discover how far and wide the virus spread in December 2019. The outbreak probably eluded detection at first, then was detected but not recognized as a new disease by doctors and nurses. After that, it was both detected and recognized, but the vital reporting was suppressed by Chinese authorities, both local and national.
北京政府坚称病毒来自国外某个地方，可能是通过冷冻食品进口的。 但解开起源的关键在于中国。 了解病毒在 2019 年 12 月的传播范围和范围尤为重要。疫情最初可能未被发现，然后被医生和护士发现但未将其识别为新疾病。 在那之后，它既被发现又被承认，但重要的报道被中国地方和国家当局压制。
To prevent the next pandemic, and to better understand this one, a serious, sustained and credible investigation is needed.
为了防止下一次疫情，并更好地了解这一流行病，需要进行认真、持续和可信的调查。
What is China hiding?
中国在隐瞒什么？
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The December mystery
十二月之谜
In the autumn of 2019, there were many signals that something unusual was happening in Wuhan, a city of more than 11 million people. Russell J. Westergard, the deputy consular chief at the U.S. Consulate there, later wrote that, by mid-October, the consulate team was aware of “an unusually vicious flu season.” Medical records show influenza-like illness, a measure of patients with respiratory ailment, soared late in November and in December in Wuhan at a rate higher than previous winter surges. The National Center for Medical Intelligence, a U.S. intelligence-gathering outfit that keeps watch for unusual health events that could affect the military, also registered signs of unusual illnesses at the time.
2019年秋天，1100万人口的武汉，有很多信号表明发生了一些不寻常的事情。 美国驻该领事馆的副领事馆长拉塞尔·韦斯特加德（Russell J. Westergard）后来写道，到 10 月中旬，领事馆团队已经意识到“流感季节异常严重”。 医疗记录显示，11 月下旬和 12 月武汉的流感样疾病（一种衡量呼吸系统疾病患者的指标）飙升的速度高于之前的冬季激增。 国家医学情报中心是一家美国情报收集机构，负责密切关注可能影响军队的异常健康事件，当时也记录了异常疾病的迹象。
Officially, the first case was someone who fell ill on either Dec. 10 or 11, though it has been difficult to establish. When sick patients first appeared, health-care workers might not have been able to distinguish their ailment from a bad seasonal flu. Later, doctors wrote “pneumonia of unknown etiology,” or origin, on patient records. At the same time, the doctors and nurses were aware that a new SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak would mean trouble. A previous one in 2002-2003 sickened 8,098 people, killed 774 and made SARS a synonym for fear, something to watch out for.
官方称，第一个病例是在 12 月 10 日或 11 日生病的人，尽管很难确定。 当病人第一次出现时，医护人员可能无法将他们的疾病与严重的季节性流感区分开来。 后来，医生在病历上写下“不明原因的肺炎”或起源。 同时，医生和护士也意识到，新的 SARS（严重急性呼吸系统综合症）爆发将带来麻烦。 之前的 2002-2003 年有 8,098 人患病，774 人死亡，并使 SARS 成为恐惧的代名词，值得提防。
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Josephine Ma, the China news editor of the South China Morning Post, in Hong Kong, reported later that the first patient was a 55-year-old who fell ill on Nov. 17, 2019. Eight more people, from 39 to 79 years old, got sick later in November. Quoting leaked government documents, Ms. Ma found 27 infections by Dec. 15, and 60 by Dec. 20. The total number of cases — mostly retrospectively confirmed either by laboratory tests or clinical diagnosis — had risen to 266 by Dec. 31, including the nine November patients. Her report was published March 13, 2020.
香港《南华早报》中国新闻编辑Josephine Ma后来报道称，首例患者是一名55岁的患者，于2019年11月17日发病。另外8人，年龄从39岁到79岁不等 老了，十一月下旬生病了。 引用泄露的政府文件，马女士在 12 月 15 日发现了 27 例感染，到 12 月 20 日发现了 60 例。截至 12 月 31 日，病例总数（主要是通过实验室检测或临床诊断进行回顾性确认）已上升至 266 例，包括 十一月的九名患者。 她的报告于 2020 年 3 月 13 日发布。
The research group DRASTIC, which has been probing the origins of the virus, has now found evidence that Ms. Ma’s report was right on target. The researchers have determined that by the end of February 2020, China had identified as many as 260 cases from the previous December. Yet China reported to the World Health Organization a year later — in early 2021 — that there were only 174 cases that December. This raises important and still unanswered questions: Who were these early cases? How did they get sick? Why were they not reported to the WHO?
一直在探索病毒起源的研究小组 DRASTIC 现在发现了证据，证明马女士的报告是正确的。 研究人员确定，截至 2020 年 2 月，中国已发现与去年 12 月相比多达 260 例。 然而，中国在一年后（即 2021 年初）向世界卫生组织报告，当年 12 月只有 174 例病例。 这提出了一些重要但仍未得到解答的问题：这些早期病例是谁？ 他们是怎么生病的？ 为什么没有向世界卫生组织报告？
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The January silence
一月的沉默
The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission issued an “urgent notice” to health institutions to look out for cases of “pneumonia of unknown origin” at 3:10 p.m. on Dec. 30. Then, at 6:50 p.m., came a second notice, warning “not to disclose information to the public without authorization.” That evening, ophthalmologist Li Wenliang, a physician at Wuhan Central Hospital, wrote in a private Weibo chat group that seven people had contracted a virus like the one that causes SARS and were quarantined at his hospital. He and other doctors were summoned by police on Jan. 1 and reprimanded for spreading rumors about SARS-like cases appearing in Wuhan hospitals. Li later died of covid-19.
武汉市卫健委于下午3点10分向卫生机构发出“紧急通知”，密切关注“不明原因肺炎”病例。 12 月 30 日。然后，下午 6 点 50 分，第二次通知，警告“未经授权不得向公众披露信息”。 当天晚上，武汉市中心医院的眼科医生李文亮在一个私人微博群中写道，有七人感染了类似导致非典的病毒，并被隔离在他的医院。 他和其他医生于 1 月 1 日被警方传唤，并因散布武汉医院出现类似 SARS 病例的谣言而受到谴责。 李后来死于武汉肺炎。
On Dec. 31, the Wuhan health commission issued its first public bulletin. It reported 27 cases of “pneumonia of unknown origin.” On Jan. 3, 2020, the commission issued a second bulletin, with 44 confirmed cases. On Jan. 4, the National Health Commission demanded laboratories and others not release any information about the illness to any media, or post it on social media. On Jan. 5, the Wuhan commission reported 59 cases, but claimed that there was no sign of human-to-human transmission and that no health-care workers had been infected.
12月31日，武汉市卫健委发布了第一份公报。 它报告了27例“不明原因肺炎”。 2020 年 1 月 3 日，该委员会发布了第二份公告，其中有 44 例确诊病例。 1月4日，国家卫健委要求实验室等不得向任何媒体发布有关该疾病的任何信息，也不得在社交媒体上发布。 1月5日，武汉市委报告了59例病例，但声称没有人传人的迹象，也没有医护人员被感染。
In late December and early January, Chinese scientists identified and verified the virus as a SARS-type through genomic sequencing. This raised a red flag: It had strong potential for human-to-human transmission. But they did not warn the public. On Jan. 11, the Wuhan health commission issued a fourth bulletin, revising the total cases downward to 41, and declaring — once again — that “no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission” had been found.
12 月底和 1 月初，中国科学家通过基因组测序确定并验证了该病毒为 SARS 型。 这引发了一个危险信号：它具有很强的人传人潜力。 但他们没有警告公众。 1 月 11 日，武汉市卫健委发布第四次通报，将病例总数下调至 41 例，并再次宣布“未发现明显的人传人证据”。
The Huanan Seafood Market, considered a possible source of the virus, had been closed and cleaned on Jan. 1, but that did not stop the spread. Instead, it was exploding.
被认为可能是病毒来源的华南海鲜市场已于 1 月 1 日关闭和清理，但这并没有阻止病毒的传播。 相反，它正在爆炸。
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After the SARS disaster of 2003, China had invested in building the National Notifiable Disease Reporting System for tracking infectious diseases. Supposedly, it would provide a very quick detection of outbreaks. But in Wuhan, it failed. Many front-line doctors were not aware of it, confused about how to report an infection of unknown nature, deterred by procedures, and fearful of making a mistake and being blamed for falsely reporting a new type of infection. As a result, according to journalists from the magazine Caixin, most medical reports were passed verbally, by mail and by phone for the first 28 days and thus were not entered into the system that was supposed to track them.
2003年非典灾难后，中国投资建设了国家法定传染病报告系统，用于追踪传染病。 据推测，它将提供对爆发的非常快速的检测。 但在武汉，它失败了。 许多一线医生对此并不知情，对如何报告未知感染感到困惑，被程序吓倒，害怕犯错误并被指责误报新型感染。 结果，据财新杂志的记者称，大多数医疗报告在前 28 天都是通过口头、邮件和电话传递的，因此没有进入本应跟踪它们的系统。
The annual political meetings in Hubei province and in Wuhan were held from Jan. 6 to Jan. 17. The government did not disclose any new cases to the public. Chinese authorities covered up the truth rather than reveal it — the trademark of an authoritarian, secretive system that prizes political stability at any cost. But privately, on Jan. 14, the head of the National Health Commission admitted to provincial officials in a teleconference that the situation is “severe and complex, the most severe challenge since SARS in 2003,” according to a memo obtained by the Associated Press.
湖北省和武汉市的年度政治会议于1月6日至17日举行。政府没有向公众披露任何新病例。 中国当局掩盖而不是揭露真相——这是一个不惜一切代价珍视政治稳定的威权、秘密制度的标志。 但据美联社获得的一份备忘录，1月14日，国家卫健委负责人私下在电话会议上向省级官员承认，形势“严峻复杂，是自2003年非典以来最严峻的挑战” .
Not until Jan. 20, three weeks after the Huanan market had been closed, and amid a rapidly expanding caseload, did Chinese experts appear on television and acknowledge the seriousness of the human-to-human transmission. On Jan. 23, China locked down Wuhan.
直到 1 月 20 日，也就是华南市场关闭三周后，在病例数量迅速增加的情况下，中国专家才出现在电视上，承认人传人的严重性。 1月23日，中国封锁了武汉。
But it was too late.
但为时已晚了。
Gag orders
禁言令
China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which reports to the National Health Commission, lacks clout, unable by law to publish epidemic data, or declare an epidemic on its own. It acts as a consultant to the health commissions, which are political and have decision-making authority.
向国家卫健委报告的中国疾病预防控制中心缺乏影响力，无法依法公布疫情数据，也无法自行宣布疫情。 它充当卫生委员会的顾问，这些委员会具有政治性并具有决策权。
But experts at the CDC did want to understand the outbreak, and that required accurate data. Starting on Feb. 6, the agency intensified its work to identify cases, including tracking retrospective ones by using hospital medical records. A leader in this effort was Yu Chuanhua, a professor of epidemiology and health statistics at Wuhan University, and a prominent scientist in his field. As he and his team examined cases, working with the CDC, the totals for December grew quickly. On Feb. 17, the CDC published a revelatory official bulletin for December, which showed 104 cases confirmed by laboratory test, 37 of them clinically diagnosed. This was a drastically different picture from the 27 cases the government had first reported to the public for that month.
但疾病预防控制中心的专家确实想了解疫情，而这需要准确的数据。 从 2 月 6 日开始，该机构加强了发现病例的工作，包括使用医院病历追踪追溯病例。 这项工作的领导者是武汉大学流行病学和健康统计学教授、该领域的杰出科学家于传华。 当他和他的团队与 CDC 合作检查病例时，12 月份的总数迅速增长。 2月17日，疾控中心发布了12月份的启示性官方公报，显示104例实验室确诊病例，其中37例为临床确诊病例。 这与政府当月首次向公众报告的 27 起案件截然不同。
But in making its report, the CDC likely overstepped its authority. On Feb. 25, the National Health Commission imposed a gag order on the CDC, demanding that it not publish papers “until the epidemic is under control,” that it must get approval from above for any new research, and no one in the CDC could share information about the epidemic, or samples. On March 3, a much wider, confidential notice was issued by the State Council — a gag order on all research and data in China on the pandemic.
但在做出报告时，疾控中心可能越权。 2月25日，国家卫健委对疾控中心下达了禁言令，要求其“在疫情得到控制之前”不得发表论文，任何新的研究都必须得到上级批准，疾控中心不得有人 可以分享有关流行病的信息或样本。 3 月 3 日，国务院发布了更广泛的机密通知——对中国所有关于大流行病的研究和数据发出禁言令。
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The WHO probe
世卫组织调查
About a year later, in early 2021, another attempt to answer questions about the origins of the pandemic got underway. From Jan. 14 to Feb. 10, a joint mission of 17 Chinese scientists and 17 from other countries and the World Health Organization met in Wuhan. Within the overall mission, a smaller working group on epidemiology studied the vital question of early cases. As part of this exercise, Chinese scientists reported to the WHO team that 174 December cases were found in the National Notifiable Disease Reporting System. These were cases of patients who had been hospitalized. Of them, 100 were confirmed by laboratory testing and 74 by clinical diagnosis.
大约一年后，即 2021 年初，又一次尝试回答有关疫情起源的问题。 1月14日至2月10日，由17名中国科学家和17名来自其他国家和世界卫生组织的科学家组成的联合考察团在武汉会面。 在整个任务中，一个较小的流行病学工作组研究了早期病例的重要问题。 作为此次演习的一部分，中国科学家向世卫组织团队报告说，在国家法定传染病报告系统中发现了 174 例 12 月病例。 这些是住院病人的病例。 其中，实验室检测确诊100例，临床诊断确诊74例。
Some of those infected had contact with the seafood market in Wuhan, some did not, and some had contact with other markets. The WHO report said “no firm conclusion” could be drawn yet about the seafood market, which sold live animals and frozen meat, among other products.
感染者有的与武汉海鲜市场有过接触，有的没有，有的与其他市场有过接触。 世卫组织的报告称，目前还无法对出售活体动物和冷冻肉类等产品的海鲜市场做出“确切结论”。
The WHO team, led by food safety expert Peter Ben Embarek, wanted to know: Were there any earlier cases, say in October or November, that might offer clues to how the pandemic began? In response, the Chinese scientists conducted a search of 233 health institutions in Wuhan, examining 76,253 records of respiratory conditions in the fall of 2019. Only 92 cases were considered possible, but all were excluded after review by the Chinese experts or retrospective testing. The Chinese apparently did not provide original raw data, methods or any independent means for corroboration by the WHO team of these results. The final report concluded that “it is considered unlikely that any substantial transmission” was occurring in October and November.
由食品安全专家彼得·本·恩巴雷克 (Peter Ben Embarek) 领导的世卫组织小组想知道：是否有更早的病例，比如 10 月或 11 月，可能为疫情如何开始提供线索？ 作为回应，中国科学家对武汉的 233 家卫生机构进行了搜索，检查了 2019 年秋季的 76,253 份呼吸系统疾病记录。只有 92 例被认为是可能的，但在中国专家审查或回顾性检测后均被排除在外。 中方显然没有提供原始原始数据、方法或任何独立手段供世卫组织团队证实这些结果。 最终报告的结论是，10 月和 11 月“被认为不太可能发生任何实质性传播”。
The joint mission was contentious. Dr. Embarek later said that China had brought heavy pressure on the researchers to not make any mention of a possible laboratory leak as the origin. Eventually, Chinese scientists relented to a statement that such a leak was “extremely unlikely.” But they had provided the visiting WHO team no way to verify such a conclusion. Dr. Embarek also said, after leaving China, that the virus “was circulating widely in Wuhan in December,” suggesting the official 174 cases were only the tip of the iceberg and the virus could have infected 1,000 or more people that month.
联合任务是有争议的。 恩巴雷克博士后来说，中国给研究人员施加了巨大压力，要求他们不提及可能的实验室泄漏作为来源。 最终，中国科学家对这种泄漏“极不可能”的声明做出了让步。 但他们没有让来访的世卫组织团队无法验证这样的结论。 恩巴雷克博士还表示，在离开中国后，该病毒“于 12 月在武汉广泛传播”，这表明官方公布的 174 例病例只是冰山一角，该病毒当月可能感染了 1000 人或更多人。
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Who were the additional cases?
新增病例是谁？
Despite the gag orders, Dr. Yu and another leading Chinese scientist, Cao Wuchun, had access to the official CDC database. Dr. Cao is a colonel in the People’s Liberation Army who studied abroad and has many connections in the international community. He was responsible for preparing what is now the official record of the 2003 SARS outbreak. Surprisingly, both scientists published papers on pandemic epidemiology that are revelatory. Dr. Yu’s paper appeared in Global Health Research and Policy in May 2021. Dr. Cao’s report in the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health came out in September 2020. A third paper, by scientists from Harvard University, Huazhong University in Wuhan, and Fudan University in Shanghai, provided additional details from the CDC database. It was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in April 2020. All three papers were peer-reviewed.
尽管有禁言令，余博士和另一位领先的中国科学家曹武春仍然可以访问 CDC 的官方数据库。 曹博士是中国人民解放军大校，曾留学海外，在国际社会有很多人脉。 他负责准备现在的 2003 年 SARS 爆发的官方记录。 令人惊讶的是，两位科学家都发表了具有启发性的疫情流行病学论文。 于博士的论文发表于2021年5月的《全球健康研究与政策》。曹博士的报告于2020年9月发表在《国际环境研究与公共卫生杂志》上。第三篇论文由哈佛大学、武汉华中大学的科学家撰写， 上海复旦大学提供了来自 CDC 数据库的更多详细信息。 它于 2020 年 4 月发表在《美国医学会杂志》上。三篇论文均经过同行评审。
The papers show that there were between 247 and 260 cases in the official CDC database for that troubled December, far more than China admitted at the outset of the pandemic, and more than the WHO was told a year later. According to the research group DRASTIC, the exact total was probably near the top of that range. The cases had reached that total in the CDC database as of the end of February 2020. This also dovetails with what Ms. Ma reported in the South China Morning Post on March 13. In the end, 33 people who fell ill in December eventually died.
这些文件显示，在那个陷入困境的 12 月，CDC 官方数据库中有 247 至 260 例病例，远远超过中国在疫情开始时承认的病例，也超过了一年后告诉世界卫生组织的病例。 根据研究小组 DRASTIC 的说法，确切的总数可能接近该范围的顶部。 截至 2020 年 2 月，CDC 数据库中的病例数已达到该总数。这也与马女士 3 月 13 日在《南华早报》上报道的情况相吻合。最终，12 月生病的 33 人最终死亡 .
The research group says the Chinese papers and other materials show the larger total includes at least 165 cases that were laboratory-confirmed, ruling out any question of validity. That compares with 100 such cases reported to the WHO. Who were these additional cases? Where? And what about November cases? The papers from the Chinese scientists do not provide answers to these questions, which might help determine how the pandemic began.
该研究小组表示，中国论文和其他材料显示，更大的总数包括至少 165 个经过实验室确认的病例，排除了任何有效性问题。 相比之下，向世卫组织报告的此类病例为 100 例。 这些额外的案例是谁？ 在哪里？ 那么11月的病例呢？ 中国科学家的论文没有提供这些问题的答案，这可能有助于确定疫情是如何开始的。
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Finding an ‘epicenter’
寻找“震中”
Scientists continue to focus on the early cases, even without cooperation from China. Michael Worobey of the University of Arizona, Kristian Andersen of the Scripps Research Institute and others took the 174 cases from the WHO-China joint mission and plotted the residential location for 155 of them using maps in the WHO report.
即使没有中国的合作，科学家们仍继续关注早期病例。 亚利桑那大学的迈克尔·沃罗比、斯克里普斯研究所的克里斯蒂安·安徒生等人从世卫组织-中国联合代表团中提取了 174 例病例，并使用世卫组织报告中的地图绘制了其中 155 例的居住位置。
In a paper published in Science magazine in July, they and their co-writers argued that the December cases were “geographically centered” on the Huanan Seafood Market, which they call the “epicenter” of the outbreak. They argue that a zoonotic spillover from wildlife happened there. Dr. Worobey has stated that a zoonotic spillover is the only plausible scenario for the origin of the pandemic, based on his research. We asked Dr. Worobey whether additional cases could change his conclusion. “With any kind of situation like a SARS-CoV-2 virus that can cause mild or even asymptomatic infection, you’re always taking a sample,” he said. “There’s probably at least 10 times more cases that we haven’t sampled because only something like six percent end up in the hospital. We fully expect the cases that we don’t sample to come from exactly the same geographic distribution as the ones that we do sample.”
在 7 月份发表在《科学》杂志上的一篇论文中，他们和他们的合著者认为，12 月份的病例“地理上集中”在他们称之为疫情“震中”的华南海鲜市场。 他们认为那里发生了野生动物的人畜共患溢出事件。 Worobey 博士表示，根据他的研究，人畜共患病外溢是流行病起源的唯一合理情景。 我们询问 Worobey 博士是否有更多病例可以改变他的结论。 他说：“在任何情况下，例如武汉肺炎病毒可能导致轻度甚至无症状感染，您总是需要采集样本。” “我们没有采样的病例可能至少有 10 倍以上，因为只有大约 6% 的病例最终被送进了医院。 我们完全期望我们不抽样的病例与我们抽样的病例来自完全相同的地理分布。”
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What if, as the Chinese scientists revealed, there were far more confirmed December cases than in the WHO report? What about the nine in November, as the leak published by Ms. Ma disclosed? The additional cases could affect the scenario of how the outbreak began, and the timing. The seafood market might have been the point of a zoonotic spillover, but it might also have been the scene of a superspreader event. The incomplete data from China is a serious obstacle for anyone trying to reach a firm conclusion about how the outbreak began.
如果像中国科学家透露的那样，12 月份确诊的病例比世卫组织报告中的要多得多怎么办？ 马女士披露的泄密事件中，11 月的九个呢？ 额外的病例可能会影响爆发的开始情况和时间。 海鲜市场可能是人畜共患病外溢的点，但它也可能是超级传播者事件的发生地。 来自中国的不完整数据对于任何试图就疫情是如何开始得出明确结论的人来说都是一个严重障碍。
It is critical to gain a better understanding of how such a monumental disaster for mankind came about. A serious investigation must return to China, looking at both the zoonotic and research-related hypotheses. It must be thorough and credible, carried out with broad expertise that includes both scientists and public health experts from within China and beyond. Nothing should be off limits or excluded.
更好地了解人类如此巨大的灾难是如何发生的至关重要。 一项严肃的调查必须回到中国，同时审视人畜共患病和研究相关的假设。 它必须是彻底和可信的，并在包括来自中国国内外的科学家和公共卫生专家在内的广泛专业知识下进行。 没有什么是禁区或排除的。
A major lesson of the pandemic is that disease surveillance — early warning systems — is crucial. Surveillance can give a leg up on mitigating disease spread, track the path and makeup of transmission in the population, and help vaccine and therapeutic researchers start to develop countermeasures. But as China discovered, the window for early warning might be short, and spotting an illness can be especially difficult if the pathogen has never been seen before. If the origins of the pandemic are found, it would give the world a head start in looking for the next one. China’s vaunted electronic notification system didn’t start working for nearly a month while the virus was rapidly spreading. That was a failure, in part, of the Chinese political system, which created a series of roadblocks, starting at the local level and later imposed at the national level. But it also is a failure that could be avoided anywhere with well-designed disease surveillance, especially taking advantage of the great advances in genomics.
这场疫情的一个重要教训是，疾病监测——早期预警系统——至关重要。监测可以帮助减轻疾病传播，追踪人群中传播的路径和构成，并帮助疫苗和治疗研究人员开始制定对策。但正如中国发现的那样，预警的窗口可能很短，如果以前从未见过病原体，发现疾病可能尤其困难。如果找到疫情的起源，它将使世界在寻找下一个疫情方面领先一步。在病毒迅速传播期间，中国自吹自擂的电子通知系统近一个月才开始工作。这在一定程度上是中国政治体制的失败，它制造了一系列障碍，从地方一级开始，然后在国家一级强加。但这也是一个可以通过精心设计的疾病监测在任何地方都可以避免的失败，尤其是利用基因组学的巨大进步。
Secrecy led to fatal consequences in the pandemic. The world owes those who have died — 6 million people by official count, but probably twice that or more — to be better prepared in the future. The coverup is immense and still in place. China should now agree to a full and thorough scientific investigation that returns to Wuhan. This black box needs to be opened.
保密导致了疫情的致命后果。 世界欠那些死去的人——官方统计的 600 万人，但可能是这个数字的两倍或更多——为未来做好更好的准备。 掩盖是巨大的，仍然存在。 中国现在应该同意返回武汉进行全面彻底的科学调查。 这个黑匣子需要打开。标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。不知不觉，武汉肺炎三岁啦！国家也已经辛辛苦苦守卫我们三年了！无论今后能否活下去，请大家不要忘记，曾经有一个国家，为了它的人民，受尽了委屈和心酸，苦了三年，累了三年！
此生不悔入华夏，来世__________家！！！
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